To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade? How do firms combine these to form transactional-governance structures? This article answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance strategies. The data collection requires a new survey question answerable in any context. The question is applied in six South American countries using representative samples, with the resultant survey weights facilitating a whole-economy analysis. Without imposing an a priori model, latent class analysis estimates meaningful governance structures. Bilateralism is always used. Law is never used alone. Bilateralism and formal institutions are rarely substitutes. Within country, inter-regional variation in governance is greater than inter-country variation. The usefulness of the data is shown by testing one element of Williamson’s discriminating-alignment agenda: greater uncertainty in the transactional environment increases the involvement of third parties.

中文翻译：

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交易治理结构：新的跨国数据及其对不确定性影响的应用

个人信任、共同利益和第三方在执行贸易协议方面的重要性如何？公司如何将这些结合起来形成交易治理结构？本文在考虑全方位交易治理策略的整个经济、跨国环境中回答了这些问题。数据收集需要一个在任何情况下都可以回答的新调查问题。该问题使用代表性样本应用于六个南美国家，由此产生的调查权重有助于整体经济分析。在不强加先验模型的情况下，潜在类别分析可以估计有意义的治理结构。双边主义总是被使用。法律从不单独使用。双边主义和正式机构很少可以替代。在国内，治理的区域间差异大于国家间差异。数据的有用性通过测试 Williamson 的区分对齐议程的一个元素来显示：交易环境中更大的不确定性会增加第三方的参与。