This article investigates whether crimes of starvation not committed as a method of warfare could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. It assesses whether it is possible to use crimes already typified in the articles of the Rome Statute to prosecute all those cases of starvation that cannot be prosecuted as war crimes because they were committed neither during an armed conflict nor in association with an armed conflict. More specifically, it addresses the question of whether nowadays peacetime starvation could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court as an act of genocide, an act of persecution, an act of extermination or as an “inhumane act”.

本文探讨国际刑事法院是否可以起诉并非作为战争手段实施的饥饿犯罪。它评估是否有可能使用《罗马规约》条款中已经规定的罪行来起诉所有那些不能作为战争罪起诉的饥饿案件，因为这些案件既不是在武装冲突期间发生的，也不是与武装冲突有关的。更具体地说，它解决了当今和平时期的饥饿是否可以被国际刑事法院作为种族灭绝行为、迫害行为、灭绝行为或“不人道行为”起诉的问题。