ABSTRACT

We are constantly called upon to evaluate the evidential weight of testimony, and to balance its deliverances against our own independent thinking. ‘Intellectual autonomy’ is the virtue that is supposed to be displayed by those who engage in cognition in this domain well. I argue that this is at best a misleading label for the virtue, because virtuous cognition in this domain consists in thinking with others, and intelligently responding to testimony. I argue that the existing label supports an excessively individualistic conception of good thinking, both within and outside philosophy. I propose replacing ‘intellectual autonomy’ with ‘intellectual interdependence’, which properly emphasises the depth of our reliance on one another, without suggesting we ought ever to be epistemically servile.

摘要

我们经常被要求评估证词的证据重要性，并在其提供与我们自己的独立思考之间取得平衡。“知性自主”是在这一领域从事认知的人应该表现出的美德。我认为这充其量是对美德的误导性标签，因为这个领域的美德认知在于与他人一起思考，并明智地回应证词。我认为现有的标签支持一种过度个人主义的良好思维概念，无论是在哲学内部还是在哲学外部。我建议用“智力相互依存”代替“智力自主”，这恰当地强调了我们相互依赖的深度，而不是暗示我们应该在认知上保持奴性。