Dialogic judicial review is a dialectic interaction between supreme courts and legislatures regarding the constitutionality of legislation, in which each institution preserves its constitutional authority, and yet performs it while considering the other institution’s stance and its ability to respond. This interaction is based on reciprocity and upon the contribution of both institutions to the constitutional design and interpretation of legislation. This dialogic interaction has much value at the institutional and instrumental level. Unfortunately, constitutional dialogue sometimes has a negative influence on petitioners and similar groups, as their rights are being trampled under a dialogic veil. This article argues that constitutional dialogue can (and sometimes must) be restricted to avoid hindering human rights during the constitutional institutional interaction. It sketches a doctrine designed to prevent impairing human rights in the name of dialogic interaction, through three arguments: (i) the constitutional dialogue must be restricted, since reality shows that courts in many cases prefer legitimacy considerations over protecting human rights; (ii) in the case of under-represented groups, there is no reason to trust legislatures to take human rights into consideration while formulating a legislative response; and (iii) courts can restrict the dialogic interaction by declaring the constitutional purpose to be unconstitutional or by using judicial decisiveness which strives for full and coercive judicial constitutional review.

中文翻译：

---

双刃剑：宪法对话受限

对话式司法审查是最高法院和立法机关之间就立法合宪性进行的辩证互动，其中每个机构都保留其宪法权威，但在执行时会考虑其他机构的立场及其回应能力。这种互动基于互惠以及两个机构对宪法设计和立法解释的贡献。这种对话互动在制度和工具层面具有很大价值。不幸的是，宪法对话有时会对请愿者和类似群体产生负面影响，因为他们的权利在对话面纱下遭到践踏。本文认为，宪法对话可以（有时必须）受到限制，以避免在宪法制度互动过程中阻碍人权。它通过三个论点概述了旨在防止以对话互动的名义损害人权的学说：（i）必须限制宪法对话，因为现实表明，在许多情况下，法院更倾向于考虑合法性而不是保护人权；(ii) 对于代表性不足的群体，没有理由相信立法机关在制定立法回应时会考虑人权；(iii) 法院可以通过宣布宪法目的违宪或使用司法决断力来限制对话互动，以争取进行全面和强制性的司法宪法审查。