In later Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, finite existence appears to be necessarily intertwined with infinite being. In response to this observation, this paper puts particular focus on the experience of finite being in order to address the specifically phenomenological (i.e., experiential) aspects of Stein’s and Conrad-Martius’ metaphysics. As a consequence, instead of pointing to eternal or infinite being, finite experience is understood to – less specifically – transcend itself. Using the notion of actus essendi (priority of existence over essence), I identify two ideas as specifically characterizing this transcendence: non-ownership of time (in Conrad-Martius), by which is questioned the coherence of inner time consciousness, as well as non-ownership of sense (in Stein), stipulating that the sense one intuitively and intellectively experiences in reference to objects is discovered, rather than made. Subsequently, the paper discusses how Stein’s and Conrad-Martius’ metaphysics of finite existence is reflected in their critical assessments of Heidegger’s existential finitude.

在后来的伊迪丝·斯坦和海德薇·康拉德-马蒂乌斯那里，有限的存在似乎必然与无限的存在交织在一起。作为对这一观察的回应，本文特别关注有限存在的体验，以解决斯坦因和康拉德-马蒂乌斯形而上学的具体现象学（即经验）方面。因此，有限的经验不是指向永恒或无限的存在，而是被理解为——不太具体地——超越自身。使用actus essendi的概念（存在优先于本质），我确定了两个概念作为这种超越的具体特征：时间的非所有权（在康拉德 - 马蒂乌斯），质疑内在时间意识的连贯性，以及感官的非所有权（在 Stein 中），规定一个人对物体的直觉和智力体验是发现的，而不是制造的。随后，本文讨论了斯坦因和康拉德-马蒂乌斯的有限存在形而上学如何反映在他们对海德格尔存在有限性的批判性评估中。