Abstract

This paper incorporates low interest rates into a framework of post Keynesian theory of the firm under financialization and uses Compustat data to provide an empirical analysis of firm behavior in the eurozone for the period 2000–2018. It reasons that expansive monetary policy targeting low interest rates will only be effective in promoting investment in a scenario where shareholder value orientation (SVO) tightens the finance constraint on growth-maximizing managers. In contrast, when shareholder value maximization becomes the goal of the firm, expansive monetary policy may not only be ineffective in promoting growth but might actually be dangerous because it fosters financial fragility and promotes SVO. Data suggest that financialization in the eurozone represents a shift in the objectives of the firm toward maximizing free cash flows. However, there is no evidence that expansive monetary policy fostered leverage and an equity reduction in the eurozone. Still, the analysis shows that low interest rates were largely ineffective in fostering investment during the period 2008–2018. Therefore, monetary policy seems insufficient to promote investment and growth. Both expansionary fiscal policy and legal reforms that control shareholder power are needed.

摘要

本文将低利率纳入金融化企业的后凯恩斯主义理论框架，并使用 Compustat 数据对 2000 年至 2018 年期间欧元区企业行为进行实证分析。它的原因是，针对低利率的扩张性货币政策只会在股东价值导向 (SVO) 收紧对增长最大化经理的财务约束的情况下有效促进投资。相反，当股东价值最大化成为公司的目标时，扩张性货币政策可能不仅无法有效促进增长，而且实际上可能是危险的，因为它会助长金融脆弱性并促进 SVO。数据表明，欧元区的金融化代表了公司目标向最大化自由现金流的转变。然而，没有证据表明扩张性货币政策助长了欧元区的杠杆作用和股本减少。尽管如此，分析表明，低利率在 2008 年至 2018 年期间在很大程度上没有促进投资。因此，货币政策似乎不足以促进投资和增长。扩张性财政政策和控制股东权力的法律改革都是必要的。