Beliefs should conform to some norms. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that your beliefs should conform to these epistemic norms just because conforming is useful. But there seems to be cases where conforming to the epistemic norms isn’t useful at all, as in so-called “too-few-reasons” cases. In response to these cases, universal epistemic instrumentalists argue that despite first appearances, it is always useful to conform to the epistemic norms. I argue that all current versions of this universalist response are objectionable. I conclude with a conjecture about why no version of universalism will succeed.

中文翻译：

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反对普遍的认知工具主义

信仰应该符合一些规范。认知工具主义认为你的信念应该符合这些认知规范，因为符合是有用的。但似乎有些情况下，遵守认知规范根本没有用，例如所谓的“原因太少”的情况。针对这些情况，普遍认知工具主义者认为，尽管第一次出现，但符合认知规范总是有用的。我认为，这种普遍主义回应的所有当前版本都是令人反感的。我以一个关于为什么没有任何版本的普遍主义会成功的猜想作为结尾。