ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen calls for the order of the statutory test of decision-making capacity to be reversed and extended from its existing sequencing in the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice. The current ‘two-stage test’, involves a ‘diagnostic test’ (requiring the establishment of impaired or disturbed functioning of the mind or brain) and a ‘functional assessment’ (examining whether that impairment or disturbance renders the person unable to make a specific decision). Despite initial judicial concern that the order in the Code is incompatible with section 2 of the Mental Capacity Act, there has been surprisingly limited academic discussion. The recent remarks of Supreme Court Justice Lord Stephens in A Local Authority v JB confirming a reverse order have, seemingly, settled the matter, and the forthcoming revised Code of Practice will likely confirm this change. This article examines the rationale underlying this change, highlighting that suggested legal and policy reasons are not as ‘sound’ as might be thought. The paper argues that changed sequencing is unlikely to resolve potential neglect of the test’s causative nexus and, furthermore, there are potentially illogical and negative practice consequences, concluding that the proposed reversal of the test is cause for considerable lament.

摘要

近年来，人们呼吁将决策能力法定测试的顺序从《心智能力法实践守则》中的现有顺序中推翻和扩展。当前的“两阶段测试”涉及“诊断测试”（需要确定大脑或大脑功能受损或受到干扰）和“功能评估”（检查该损害或干扰是否导致患者无法进行具体决定）。尽管最初的司法部门担心法典中的命令与《心智能力法》第 2 条不相符，但学术讨论却出人意料地有限。最高法院大法官斯蒂芬斯勋爵最近在地方当局诉 JB 案中确认反向命令的言论似乎已经解决了这个问题，即将出台的修订版《行为准则》可能会确认这一变化。本文探讨了这一变化背后的基本原理，强调建议的法律和政策原因并不像人们想象的那样“合理”。该论文认为，改变顺序不太可能解决对测试因果关系的潜在忽视，此外，还存在潜在的不合逻辑和负面的实践后果，结论是提议的测试逆转是引起相当大的遗憾的原因。