This paper revisits the Swedish banking crisis (1919–1926) that materialized as post-war deflation replaced wartime inflation (1914–1918). Inspired by Fisher’s “debt deflation theory,” we employ survival analysis to “predict” which banks would fail, given certain ex-ante bank characteristics. Our tests support the theory; maturity structures mattered most in a regime of falling prices, with vulnerable shorter-term customer loans and bank liabilities representing the most consistent cause of bank distress in the crisis. Similarly, stronger growth in (1) leverage, (2) weaker collateral loans, and (3) foreign borrowing during the boom were all associated with bank failure.

中文翻译：

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高点和低点：瑞典银行因通货膨胀和通缩而倒闭，1914-1926

本文重新审视了瑞典银行业危机（1919-1926 年），这场危机以战后通货紧缩取代战时通货膨胀（1914-1918 年）而实现。受 Fisher 的“债务通缩理论”启发，我们采用生存分析来“预测”哪些银行会在给定某些事前银行特征的情况下倒闭。我们的测试支持该理论；在价格下跌的情况下，期限结构最为重要，脆弱的短期客户贷款和银行负债是危机中银行陷入困境的最一贯原因。同样，繁荣期间 (1) 杠杆率的强劲增长，(2) 抵押贷款的减少，以及 (3) 外国借款的增长都与银行倒闭有关。