ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to put on the map Husserl's discussion of “secondary experience” as an alternative basis for an epistemology of testimony. In current discussions about social epistemology, the majority of scholars characterize testimony as “the transfer of a belief.” On the contrary, in light of Husserl's notion of “secondary experience,” testimony is best characterized as a sharing of experience rather than a transfer of belief. Husserl discusses the notion of “secondary experience” in Appendix XII of Husserliana 15. In this paper I develop a systematic analysis of “secondary experience,” and I integrate Husserl's analysis of testimony in Appendix XII with his other analyses developed in the Cartesian Meditations, manuscripts written in the same period, and Experience and Judgment. In the conclusion of the paper I very briefly argue for the superiority of Husserl's view of testimony over the majority view.

摘要

本文的目的是将胡塞尔关于“次级经验”的讨论作为证据认识论的替代基础放在地图上。在当前关于社会认识论的讨论中，大多数学者将证词描述为“一种信念的转移”。相反，根据胡塞尔的“次级经验”概念，证言最好被描述为经验的分享而不是信念的转移。胡塞尔在Husserliana 15的附录 XII 中讨论了“次级经验”的概念。在这篇论文中，我对“次级经验”进行了系统的分析，并将胡塞尔在附录 XII 中对证词的分析与他在笛卡尔沉思中发展的其他分析相结合、同期手稿、《经验与判断》。在本文的结论中，我非常简要地论证了胡塞尔的证词观点优于大多数人的观点。