ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to suggest that the fictionalist’s emotions toward religious discourse could be better supported than the current literature allows. By ‘fictionalist’ I mean those of whom interpret religious discourse as useful fiction. The threefold structure of the article will argue that: (1) the concept of aliefs has been falsely equated with the concept of imagining, (2) the fictionalist ought to adopt a hybrid theory of emotions rather than a cognitive appraisal and, (3) if (1) and (2) are accepted, then key issues concerning the genuineness and appropriateness of emotions toward fictional entities can be overcome. I will conclude that something significant is at stake here, and that is whether or not the fictionalist’s emotions are deemed ‘real’ or not. Thus, to provide the best defence of the fictionalist’s emotions is to: (A) separate that which has been lumped together, that is: quasi emotions and alief-evoked emotions (B) argue for the hybrid account of emotions and, (C) defend the genuine and appropriate nature of fictional emotions.

摘要

这篇文章的目的是建议比当前文献允许的更好地支持虚构主义者对宗教话语的情感。我所说的“小说家”是指那些将宗教话语解释为有用的小说的人。文章的三重结构将论证：(1) 信念的概念被错误地等同于想象的概念，(2) 小说家应该采用情感的混合理论而不是认知评估，以及 (3)如果 (1) 和 (2) 被接受，那么关于对虚构实体的情感的真实性和适当性的关键问题就可以被克服。我会得出结论，这里有一些重要的东西处于危险之中，那就是小说家的情感是否被认为是“真实的”。因此，为小说家的情绪提供最好的保护是：