ABSTRACT

There has been much interest in conspiracy theories (CTs) amongst philosophers in recent years. The aim of this paper will be to apply some of the philosophical research to issues in political theory. I will first provide an overview of some of the philosophical discussions about CTs. While acknowledging that particularism is currently the dominant position in the literature, I will contend that the ‘undue scepticism problem’, a modified version of an argument put forward by Brian Keeley, is an important general objection to many CTs. This in turn leads to some substantial conclusions for liberal political philosophy, as the undue scepticism problem sets up a strong argument against non-liberal alternatives to liberal thought. I shall argue that we are justified in having far more doubt about the reliability of official sources in non-liberal societies, and it is legitimate to be more sceptical about claims designed to bolster non-liberal politics. Moreover, because scepticism is often more warranted in non-liberal societies, this may provide the possibility for the state to be stable, even if it is highly tyrannical or ineffective. These considerations are not intended to be decisive, but raise unresolved questions about the viability of non-liberal politics.

摘要

近年来，哲学家们对阴谋论（CT）产生了浓厚的兴趣。本文的目的是将一些哲学研究应用于政治理论中的问题。我将首先概述一些有关 CT 的哲学讨论。在承认特殊主义的同时目前在文献中占主导地位，我认为“过度怀疑问题”（Brian Keeley 提出的论点的修改版本）是对许多 CT 的重要普遍反对意见。这反过来又为自由主义政治哲学带来了一些实质性结论，因为过度怀疑主义问题为反对自由主义思想的非自由主义替代品提出了强有力的论据。我认为，我们有理由对非自由主义社会的官方消息来源的可靠性抱有更多的怀疑，并且对旨在支持非自由主义政治的主张抱有更多的怀疑也是合理的。此外，由于在非自由社会中怀疑主义往往更有道理，这可能为国家提供稳定的可能性，即使它是高度专制或无效的。