Both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) make extensive references to humanity. Yet the role attributed to humanity differs between the two. Humanity is seen in IHRL as the source of the rights, whereas in IHL it is interpreted as a moral obligation to avoid harm. This article challenges this perspective. Relying upon contemporary interpretations of IHL, it will be argued that, in a moral sense, IHL matches up closely with IHRL. Crucial here is that humanity, rather than reflect a utilitarian perspective to avoid harm, is worded in stronger terms. To reflect this accurately, it is argued that IHL is best seen as a reflection of TM Scanlon's contractualism as opposed to utilitarian reasoning. Relying upon the similarities in moral reasoning visible in both bodies of law, the article argues that this should also be reflected when it comes to redress for violations. In a concrete sense, the argument here is that this also presents a moral requirement to recognise individual claims within IHL. To give legal effect to this moral demand, it is suggested that IHRL might play a role in bridging the gap between the moral and legal considerations in IHL.

国际人道法 (IHL) 和国际人权法 (IHRL) 都广泛提及人道。然而，归因于人类的作用在两者之间是不同的。人道在国际人权法中被视为权利的来源，而在国际人道法中，人道被解释为避免伤害的道德义务。本文挑战了这一观点。根据对国际人道法的当代解释，有人认为，在道德意义上，国际人道法与国际人权法非常相近。这里的关键是，人性不是反映避免伤害的功利主义观点，而是用更强烈的措辞。为了准确地反映这一点，有人认为，国际人道法最好被视为 TM 斯坎伦契约主义的反映，而不是功利主义推理。依靠在两个法律体系中可见的道德推理的相似性，文章认为，在涉及对侵权行为的补救时也应反映这一点。具体而言，这里的论点是，这也提出了在国际人道法范围内承认个人主张的道德要求。为了使这一道德要求具有法律效力，建议国际人权法在弥合国际人道法中道德和法律考虑之间的差距方面发挥作用。