Security assistance is a pillar of U.S. foreign policy and a ubiquitous feature of international relations. The record, however, is mixed at best. Security assistance is hard because recipient leaders are often motivated to implement policies that keep their militaries weak. The central challenge of security assistance, then, is influence. How does the United States aim to influence recipient leaders to improve their militaries, and what drives its approach? Influence in security assistance can be understood as an escalation ladder with four rungs: teaching, persuasion, conditionality, and direct command. Washington increasingly delegates security assistance to the Department of Defense, and the latter to the U.S. Army. U.S. Army advisers tend to rely exclusively on teaching and persuasion, even when recipient leaders routinely ignore their advice. The U.S. Army's preference for persuasion and aversion to conditionality in security assistance can be traced to its bureaucratic interests and to the ideology that it has developed—the cult of the persuasive—to advance those interests. A case study examines the bureaucratic drivers of the U.S. Army's persistent reliance on persuasion to influence Iraqi leaders to reform and strengthen the Iraqi Army. Qualitative analysis leverages over one hundred original interviews, as well as oral histories and recently declassified U.S. Central Command documents. The findings illustrate how the interests and ideologies of the military services tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy can instead undermine it.

安全援助是美国外交政策的支柱，也是国际关系中无处不在的特征。然而，记录充其量是喜忧参半。安全援助之所以困难，是因为受援国领导人往往有动力实施削弱其军队的政策。那么，安全援助的核心挑战就是影响力。美国打算如何影响受援国领导人改善他们的军队，是什么推动了它的做法？安全援助中的影响可以理解为具有四个梯级的升级阶梯：教导、说服、条件和直接命令。华盛顿越来越多地将安全援助委托给国防部，而后者则委托给美国陆军。美国陆军顾问往往完全依赖教导和说服，即使接受领导者经常忽视他们的建议。美国陆军在安全援助中对说服的偏好和对附加条件的厌恶可以追溯到它的官僚利益和它为促进这些利益而发展的意识形态——对说服的崇拜。一项案例研究审视了美国陆军持续依赖说服来影响伊拉克领导人改革和加强伊拉克军队的官僚驱动因素。定性分析利用了一百多个原始访谈、口述历史和最近解密的美国中央司令部文件。调查结果说明了负责执行美国外交政策的军事部门的利益和意识形态如何反而会破坏它。在安全援助中偏爱说服和厌恶条件性可以追溯到其官僚利益和它为促进这些利益而发展的意识形态——说服者崇拜。一项案例研究审视了美国陆军持续依赖说服来影响伊拉克领导人改革和加强伊拉克军队的官僚驱动因素。定性分析利用了一百多个原始访谈、口述历史和最近解密的美国中央司令部文件。调查结果说明了负责执行美国外交政策的军事部门的利益和意识形态如何反而会破坏它。在安全援助中偏爱说服和厌恶条件性可以追溯到其官僚利益和它为促进这些利益而发展的意识形态——说服者崇拜。一项案例研究审视了美国陆军持续依赖说服来影响伊拉克领导人改革和加强伊拉克军队的官僚驱动因素。定性分析利用了一百多个原始访谈、口述历史和最近解密的美国中央司令部文件。调查结果说明了负责执行美国外交政策的军事部门的利益和意识形态如何反而会破坏它。军队持续依靠说服来影响伊拉克领导人改革和加强伊拉克军队。定性分析利用了一百多个原始访谈、口述历史和最近解密的美国中央司令部文件。调查结果说明了负责执行美国外交政策的军事部门的利益和意识形态如何反而会破坏它。军队持续依靠说服来影响伊拉克领导人改革和加强伊拉克军队。定性分析利用了一百多个原始访谈、口述历史和最近解密的美国中央司令部文件。调查结果说明了负责执行美国外交政策的军事部门的利益和意识形态如何反而会破坏它。