We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.

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IRS 监控对银行贷款成本有影响吗？

我们表明，IRS 监控对银团贷款的成本有显着的负面影响。美国国税局审计概率每增加一个标准差，贷款利差就会减少约 9 个基点。我们还发现，对于拥有更好借贷关系和可靠进入公共市场的借款人来说，这种影响更大。这些结果表明 IRS 监控可以增加借款人的议价能力并限制银行从其贷款关系中提取信息租金。因此，它们为 IRS 监控如何降低银行系统的融资成本提供了新的见解。