I provide empirical evidence that labour market frictions have an adverse effect on the quality of analyst research. Using the staggered, voluntary adoption of the Protocol for Broker Recruiting (Protocol) since 2004, I show that, without non-compete agreements, financial analysts produce more accurate forecasts and exert greater efforts in updating their research more frequently. Consistent with the notion that information asymmetry in the capital market are lower in the post-Protocol period, I provide empirical evidence and argue that the research coverage by Protocol members enables managers to access capital and extend their investment opportunities. My findings suggest that analyst coverage by Protocol members has a favourable effect on investment in innovative projects, production capacity and acquisitions.

中文翻译：

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分析师研究质量的实际影响：采用经纪人协议的证据

我提供的经验证据表明，劳动力市场摩擦对分析师研究的质量有不利影响。通过自 2004 年以来交错、自愿采用的经纪人招募协议（协议），我表明，在没有非竞争协议的情况下，金融分析师可以做出更准确的预测，并更加努力地更频繁地更新他们的研究。与后协议时期资本市场信息不对称程度较低的观点相一致，我提供了实证证据，并认为协议成员的研究范围使管理者能够获得资本并扩大投资机会。我的研究结果表明，协议成员的分析师报道对创新项目、产能和收购的投资有有利的影响。