Much research in robotic artificial intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life has focused on autonomous agents as an embodied and situated approach to AI. Such systems are commonly viewed as overcoming many of the philosophical problems associated with traditional computationalist AI and cognitive science, such as the grounding problem (Harnad) or the lack of intentionality (Searle), because they have the physical and sensorimotor grounding that traditional AI was argued to lack. Robot lawn mowers and self-driving cars, for example, more or less reliably avoid obstacles, approach charging stations, and so on—and therefore might be considered to have some form of artificial intentionality or intentional directedness. It should be noted, though, that the fact that robots share physical environments with people does not necessarily mean that they are situated in the same perceptual and social world as humans. For people encountering socially interactive systems, such as social robots or automated vehicles, this poses the nontrivial challenge to interpret them as intentional agents to understand and anticipate their behavior but also to keep in mind that the intentionality of artificial bodies is fundamentally different from their natural counterparts. This requires, on one hand, a “suspension of disbelief ” but, on the other hand, also a capacity for the “suspension of belief.” This dual nature of (attributed) artificial intentionality has been addressed only rather superficially in embodied AI and social robotics research. It is therefore argued that Bourgine and Varela’s notion of Artificial Life as the practice of autonomous systems needs to be complemented with a practice of socially interactive autonomous systems, guided by a better understanding of the differences between artificial and biological bodies and their implications in the context of social interactions between people and technology.

机器人人工智能 (AI) 和人工生命方面的许多研究都集中在自主代理上，将其作为人工智能的具体化和情境化方法。此类系统通常被认为克服了与传统计算人工智能和认知科学相关的许多哲学问题，例如基础问题（Harnad）或缺乏意向性（Searle），因为它们具有传统人工智能所具有的物理和感觉运动基础。辩称缺乏。例如，机器人割草机和自动驾驶汽车或多或少能够可靠地避开障碍物、接近充电站等，因此可能被认为具有某种形式的人工意向性或意向导向性。但值得注意的是，机器人与人类共享物理环境的事实并不一定意味着它们与人类处于相同的感知和社会世界中。对于遇到社交互动系统（例如社交机器人或自动车辆）的人们来说，这提出了不小的挑战，要将它们解释为有意代理以理解和预测他们的行为，但也要记住，人造身体的意向性与自然物体的意向性有着根本的不同。同行。一方面，这需要“暂停怀疑”，但另一方面，也需要“暂停信仰”的能力。（归因）人工意向性的这种双重性在具体人工智能和社交机器人研究中仅得到相当肤浅的解决。因此，有人认为，Bourgine 和 Varela 的“人工生命”作为自主系统的实践的概念需要以社会互动自主系统的实践来补充，并以更好地理解人造体和生物体之间的差异及其在环境中的含义为指导。人与技术之间的社会互动。