ABSTRACT

Street-level bureaucracy (SLB) theory posits bureaucratic demands and resource scarcity are primary drivers of suboptimal SLB-client interactions. As such, mitigating SLBs’ bureaucratic work is considered key to improving client treatment. Yet, little evidence exists that reconfiguring bureaucratic demands enhances SLB client engagement or decision-making. To this end, this study considers a case management team model where lead caseworkers were primarily responsible for client engagement while case assistants managed bureaucratic demands in a large southwest nonprofit’s anti-poverty program. We draw on interviews (N = 38) at two points in time with team members to examine the relationship between bureaucratic delineation, resource allocations, and decision-making. We find that delineating bureaucratic work along with teams’ access to generous client provisions expands the breadth and quality of resource distribution, but this is mitigated by team relational demands such as frequent case meetings. Our findings suggest enhanced resources are not necessarily a panacea for improving SLB-client engagement.

摘要

街头官僚 (SLB) 理论认为官僚需求和资源稀缺是次优 SLB 与客户交互的主要驱动因素。因此，减轻 SLB 的官僚工作被认为是改善客户待遇的关键。然而，几乎没有证据表明重新配置官僚需求会增强 SLB 客户参与或决策制定。为此，本研究考虑了一个个案管理团队模型，在这个模型中，首席个案工作者主要负责客户参与，而个案助理则在一个大型西南非营利组织的反贫困计划中管理官僚需求。我们利用访谈 ( N = 38) 在两个时间点与团队成员一起检查官僚划定、资源分配和决策制定之间的关系。我们发现，描述官僚工作以及团队获得慷慨的客户供应的机会扩大了资源分配的广度和质量，但这被团队关系需求（如频繁的案例会议）所缓解。我们的研究结果表明，增加资源不一定是改善 SLB 与客户互动的灵丹妙药。