In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, given the level of infection, describes the observed variety of mitigation policies and citizens’ compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Our results show that different stable equilibria exist and that different ways/paths exist to reach these equilibria may be present, depending on the choice of parameters. When the parameters are chosen opportunistically, in the short run, our model generates transitions between hard and soft policy measures to deal with the pandemic. In the long-run, convergence is achieved toward one of the possible stable steady states (obey or not obey lockdown rules) as functions of politicians’ and citizens’ incentives.

在本文中，我们模拟了政治家和公民之间的进化非合作博弈，在给定感染水平的情况下，描述了在 COVID-19 大流行期间观察到的各种缓解政策和公民的遵守情况。我们的结果表明，存在不同的稳定平衡，并且根据参数的选择，可能存在达到这些平衡的不同方式/路径。当机会主义地选择参数时，在短期内，我们的模型会在应对这一流行病的硬政策措施和软政策措施之间产生过渡。从长远来看，作为政客和公民激励的函数，会朝着一种可能的稳定状态（遵守或不遵守封锁规则）实现收敛。