This paper highlights the existence of a nonlinear relationship between bank stability and competition and analyzes the role that government intervention plays in shaping this relationship. We used a sample of 45 banks in North African countries over the period 2005–2019. We applied a semiparametric approach based on penalized spline estimation. The results unveil the specific shape of the competition–stability relationship at different levels of competition; banks reconsider their risk-taking behavior at each level of competition. This nonmonotonic stability at different levels of competition is attributed to the quality of intervention, which is found to be an important determinant in shaping this relationship. Thus, we explain the dispersion of risk levels among North African banks in part by the quality of regulation in each country and conclude by recommending the strengthening of regulation, supervision and the macro-prudential framework.

中文翻译：

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银行稳定性、竞争和干预质量之间的关系是非线性的吗？来自北非国家的证据

本文强调了银行稳定性与竞争之间非线性关系的存在，并分析了政府干预在塑造这种关系中所起的作用。我们使用了 2005 年至 2019 年期间北非国家 45 家银行的样本。我们应用了一种基于惩罚样条估计的半参数方法。结果揭示了不同竞争水平下竞争-稳定关系的具体形态；银行重新考虑他们在每个竞争水平上的冒险行为。这种在不同竞争水平上的非单调稳定性归因于干预的质量，这被发现是塑造这种关系的重要决定因素。因此，