We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within-firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8-K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term-limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.

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企业如何应对政治不确定性？来自美国州长选举的证据

我们从两个方面研究对政治不确定性的联合反应：实际活动的变化和自愿披露。我们利用选举前的民意调查优势和公司的国家风险敞口数据，重点关注美国州长竞争性选举前的公司内部风险敞口变化。尽管在势均力敌的选举前几年，实际活动有所下降，但我们发现自愿披露的频率和内容都在增加，包括在提及举行选举的州的文件中提到风险。我们的测试将 8-K 申请分解为实际活动和自愿披露，以解决这两种反应之间的内生互补性。当使用基于任期有限的现任者、历史上竞争性职位的政治不确定性的替代事前衡量标准时，这些结果仍然成立。或州立法机关陷入僵局。政治不确定性的两种影响对于高度监管行业的公司来说更强，而对于那些对当地市场影响最小的公司来说则更弱，将实际活动和披露反应与不确定性联系起来。