Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), legislators deploy expedited procedures to repeal agency regulations. For decades, the conventional wisdom—drawn from a handful of cases in which rules were repealed—has been that the CRA is primarily used by Republicans to nullify regulations issued at the close of Democratic presidential administrations. In this article, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom provides an incomplete account of the use of the CRA. The centerpiece of our approach is an original data set of all resolutions disapproving of agency regulations introduced over a 26-year period. The analysis of this data set demonstrates that Democrats make regular use of the CRA and that resolutions are consistently pursued outside of presidential transitions. Given these patterns, we argue (contrary to existing accounts) that the CRA is not inherently deregulatory and routinely has utility as an instrument of position taking for legislators of both political parties.

中文翻译：

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超越共和党人和不赞成法规：国会审查法的新实证方法

根据《国会审查法》(CRA)，立法者部署了加速程序来废除机构规定。几十年来，传统智慧——从少数规则被废除的案例中得出——一直认为 CRA 主要被共和党人用来废除民主党总统任期结束时发布的法规。在本文中，我们证明了传统智慧对 CRA 的使用提供了不完整的说明。我们方法的核心是一个原始数据集，其中包含 26 年来引入的所有不赞成机构法规的决议。对该数据集的分析表明，民主党人经常使用 CRA，并且在总统换届之外一贯追求决议。鉴于这些模式，