This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have homogeneous ordinal preferences over colleges, but their preference intensities vary, and the exam scores determine their priorities. In equilibrium, student application strategies take a cutoff form. The strategies depend on their exam scores under post-score submissions, on preference intensities under pre-exam submissions, and on both preference intensities and signals about their exam scores under pre-score submissions. Given these equilibrium strategies, students are better off under pre-exam and pre-score submissions than post-score submissions. When students with the same preference intensities and exam scores receive signals of different qualities, those with bad signals could be hurt by those with good signals.

中文翻译：

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波士顿机制下优先权提交的时间

本文考虑了波士顿机制下的集中大学招生模式，其中学生可能对自己的优先事项存在不确定性。学生对大学的偏好顺序是同质的，但他们的偏好强度各不相同，考试成绩决定了他们的优先顺序。在均衡状态下，学生的申请策略采取截止形式。这些策略取决于他们在分数提交后的考试分数、考试前提交的偏好强度以及分数前提交的偏好强度和有关考试分数的信号。考虑到这些平衡策略，学生在考试前和分数前提交的情况比分数后提交的情况更好。当具有相同偏好强度和考试成绩的学生收到不同质量的信号时，