We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.

中文翻译：

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信息设计、外部性和政府干预

我们考虑具有溢出效应的贝叶斯说服模型。发送者提供信息来说服接收者采取具有外部效果的行动。我们考虑政府干预措施，包括纠正性补贴和税收，如何影响社会福利。除了内部化外部性之外，政府干预还通过信息渠道影响社会福利。对发送者的首选行为的补贴会激励发送者透露更少的信息，但对发送者的首选行为征税会激励发送者透露更多的信息。由于这种信息效应，最优补贴和税收可能与外部性的大小不同。在某些情况下，无需政府干预即可实现社会福利最大化。