Positivists and interpretivists (Dworkinians) might accept that conceptual facts about the law—facts about the content of the concept of law—can obtain in the absence of communities with law practices. But they would deny that legal facts can obtain in such communities’ absence. Under the moral impact theory, by contrast, legal facts can precede all communities with law practices. I identify a set of legal facts in private international law—the law of jurisdiction—that concerns when a community's law practices can, and cannot, have the legal effects that the practices claim to have. This law is noncommunitarian, in the sense that it precedes the communities to which it applies. In this law's light, the legal effects of communities’ law practices are legally coordinated (or, at the very least, can be shown to legally conflict). Although interest in, and even commitment to, a noncommunitarian law of jurisdiction has receded among private international law theorists, I argue that some well-placed questions can elicit from all of us a commitment to this law. And this commitment is a reason to believe that the moral impact theory is correct.

实证主义者和解释主义者（德沃金主义者）可能会接受，关于法律的概念性事实——关于法律概念内容的事实——可以在没有法律实践的共同体的情况下获得。但他们否认在这些社区缺席的情况下可以获得法律事实。相比之下，根据道德影响理论，法律事实可以先于所有具有法律实践的社区。我确定了国际私法中的一组法律事实——管辖权法——这涉及到一个社区的法律实践何时能够或不能具有这些实践所声称的法律效力。该法律是非社群主义的，因为它先于其适用的社区。根据该法，社区法律实践的法律效果在法律上是协调的（或者至少可以表明在法律上是冲突的）。尽管国际私法理论家对非社群主义管辖权法的兴趣甚至承诺已经消退，但我认为，一些恰当的问题可以引起我们所有人对这一法律的承诺。这一承诺是我们相信道德影响理论正确的理由。