This paper revisits the classic question of legal origins: whether laws originating from common or civil law traditions are more effective in promoting governance rules with stronger shareholder and investor protection. But corporate governance cannot be easily disentangled from other sources that can influence firm outcomes. This paper disentangles these effects by assembling a new dataset of corporations in Egypt between 1887 and 1914. Egypt had an unusual system of incorporation. The main legal system was a close French transplant but entrepreneurs – Europeans and Egyptians alike – had the option of incorporating under any European law. This practice allowed extraordinary legal flexibility in choice of law, governance provisions, and board composition. The new findings show that companies incorporated under British law provided weaker shareholder protection than companies incorporated under French laws, especially in giving weaker voting rights to minority shareholders, preventing oversight over directors' borrowing powers, and limiting director rotation. These rules mattered for firm performance. Corporations with weaker investor protection had higher failure risk, were less profitable, and had lower firm value.

中文翻译：

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公司治理的法律起源：埃及的法律选择，1887 年至 1914 年

本文重新审视了法律起源的经典问题：源自普通法或民法传统的法律是否更有效地促进治理规则，并提供更强有力的股东和投资者保护。但公司治理不能轻易地与影响公司业绩的其他来源区分开来。本文通过收集 1887 年至 1914 年间埃及公司的新数据集来理清这些影响。埃及有一个不寻常的公司制度。主要的法律制度是法国移植的，但企业家——欧洲人和埃及人——都可以选择根据任何欧洲法律进行合并。这种做法在法律选择、治理规定和董事会组成方面提供了非凡的法律灵活性。新调查结果显示，根据英国法律成立的公司比根据法国法律成立的公司提供的股东保护更弱，特别是在赋予少数股东较弱的投票权、阻止对董事借用权的监督以及限制董事轮换方面。这些规则对于公司业绩很重要。投资者保护较弱的公司失败风险较高，利润较低，公司价值较低。