This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-group conflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in a population are characterized by high and low productivity types and they are matched in pairs to form social relationships such as mating or foraging relationships. In each relationship, an individual’s payoff is increasing in its own type and its partner’s type. Hence, the payoff structure of a relationship does not resemble a dilemma situation. Assume that types are not observable. In one population, assortative matching according to types is sustained by signaling. In the other population, individuals do not signal and they are randomly matched. Types evolve within each population. At the same time, the two populations may engage in conflicts. Due to assortative matching, high types grow faster in the population with signaling, yet they bear the cost of signaling, which lowers their population’s fitness in the long run. Through simulations, we show that the survival of the signaling population depends crucially on the timing and the efficiency of weapons used in inter-group conflicts.

本文提出了一个模型来解释群体间冲突在决定信号规范兴衰方面的潜在作用。种群中的个体具有高生产力类型和低生产力类型的特征，它们成对配对以形成社会关系，例如交配或觅食关系。在每一种关系中，个人的收益在其自身类型和伴侣类型中都在增加。因此，关系的收益结构与两难境地不同。假设类型是不可观察的。在一个种群中，根据类型进行分类匹配是由信号维持的。在其他人群中，个体不发出信号，他们是随机匹配的。类型在每个种群中进化。同时，这两个人群可能会发生冲突。由于分类匹配，高种群在有信号的人群中生长得更快，但它们承担了信号的成本，从长远来看，这会降低其种群的适应性。通过模拟，我们表明信号种群的生存在很大程度上取决于群体间冲突中使用武器的时间和效率。