Can imposers of sanctions end economic coercion without the fear of strengthening their targets’ capabilities? Senders may prefer to end sanctions given its ex post inefficiency, yet doing so might provide the target greater access to resources and contribute to its offensive behavior. Targets’ inability to credibly commit to reversing their policies while enjoying the gains from sanctions relief, coupled with the difficulty of perfectly observing their compliance behavior, creates an obstacle for ending sanctions and resuming profitable economic transactions. Using a game-theoretic model of sanctions removal under uncertainty about targets’ intentions and compliance behavior, I formally demonstrate and empirically find that sanctions are more likely to end if senders can successfully detect targets’ compliance, but only if the target considers the promised sanctions relief attractive. Targets that offset the costs of sanctions will not value the promised sanctions relief and choose not to negotiate over sanctions removal.

中文翻译：

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在讨价还价问题的阴影下结束经济制裁

制裁实施者能否结束经济胁迫而不用担心加强其目标的能力？鉴于事后效率低下，发件人可能更愿意结束制裁，但这样做可能会为目标提供更多的资源访问权限，并助长其攻击行为。目标公司无法在享受制裁减免收益的同时可靠地承诺扭转其政策，再加上难以完全遵守其合规行为，这为结束制裁和恢复有利可图的经济交易造成了障碍。使用在目标意图和合规行为不确定的情况下取消制裁的博弈论模型，我正式证明并凭经验发现，如果发件人能够成功检测到目标的合规性，制裁更有可能结束，但前提是目标认为承诺的制裁减免具有吸引力。抵消制裁成本的目标不会重视承诺的制裁减免，也不会选择就解除制裁进行谈判。