Can metaphysics yield the consolations of philosophy? One possibility, defended by Derek Parfit, is that reflection on the nature of identity and time could diminish both fear of death and grief. In this paper, I assess the prospect of such consolation, focussing especially on attempts to console a grieving third party. A shift to a reductionist view of personal identity might mean that death is less threatening. However, there is some evidence to suggest that such a shift does not necessarily translate into less death anxiety. Moreover, applied to grief at loss of another, such a perspective may be misdirected. A temporally neutral perspective offers a theoretically powerful way of reducing the sense of loss at being separated in time from a loved one. However, it is unclear whether it is psychologically possible to achieve. Even if it were possible, it may not diminish the pain of separation.

I identify a serious challenge to philosophical consolation for grief. The greater the consolation that is offered, the greater the risk of losing important attachments and the less it may be psychologically accessible.

形而上学能否提供哲学的慰藉？德里克·帕菲特 (Derek Parfit) 捍卫的一种可能性是，对身份和时间的本质进行反思可以减少对死亡和悲伤的恐惧。在这篇论文中，我评估了这种安慰的前景，特别关注安慰悲伤的第三方的尝试。转向对个人身份的还原论观点可能意味着死亡威胁较小。然而，有一些证据表明，这种转变并不一定会减少死亡焦虑。此外，应用于失去他人的悲伤时，这种观点可能会被误导。时间中立的观点提供了一种理论上有效的方法，可以减少与亲人及时分离时的失落感。但是，心理上是否有可能实现尚不清楚。

我发现对悲痛的哲学安慰是一个严峻的挑战。提供的安慰越大，失去重要依恋的风险就越大，心理上也就越不容易接近。