Influential moral theories keyed to benevolence (including Mengzi’s and Hutcheson’s) claim a footing for ideal moral benevolence in natural human benevolence. The meaning of this claim depends on how natural and ideal benevolence are conceived and how the two are supposed to be related—as Mengzi suggests, for example, that there is an innate “sprout” of compassionate aversion to suffering that tends to grow into moral humaneness. In any case it is plausible that some sort of spontaneous and consistent human friendliness supports a moral standard of unselfish concern for the well-being of others. The premise of benevolence theory is strengthened when we take account of a largely overlooked form of general good will: benevolent interest in the efforts of others. Here too a form of moral benevolence may grow from a base in natural good will, a point anticipated in Aristotle’s observation that our friendly interest in others is stimulated by the contestants in sports events. The sports spectator act of “pulling for” contestants, though conflicted by competition and exploited for various nonmoral satisfactions, is a vivid specimen of a general pulling for all innocent efforts in an inclusive moral fellowship of triers.

以仁为核心的有影响力的道德理论（包括孟子和哈奇森的）主张在自然的人类仁慈中建立理想的道德仁慈的立足点。这一主张的意义取决于如何构想自然和理想的仁爱，以及两者之间的关系——例如，正如孟子所暗示的那样，有一种天生的对痛苦的同情厌恶的“萌芽”，它往往会发展成道德人道。无论如何，某种自发的、始终如一的人类友善支持无私关心他人福祉的道德标准是合理的。当我们考虑到普遍善意的一种在很大程度上被忽视的形式时，仁慈理论的前提得到加强：对他人努力的仁慈兴趣。在这里，一种道德仁慈的形式也可以从自然善意的基础上产生，亚里士多德观察到的一点是，我们对他人的友好兴趣是由体育赛事的参赛者激发的。体育观众“拉”参赛者的行为，虽然与竞争相冲突，并为各种非道德的满足所利用，但却是一个生动的例子，表明在包容性的道德友谊中，对所有无辜努力的普遍拉动。