In this paper I propose and motivate a logic of the interdefined concepts of making true and control, understood as intensional propositional operators to be indexed to an agent. While bearing a resemblance to earlier logics in the tradition, the motivations, semantics, and object language theory differ on crucial points. Applying this logic to widespread formal theories of agency, I use it as a framework to argue against the ubiquitous assumption that the strongest actions or options available to a given agent must always be pairwise incompatible. The conclusion is that this assumption conflicts with failures of higher order control of agents over their degree or precision of control, failures exhibited by such imperfect agents as ourselves. I discuss models in this setting for understanding such imperfectly self-controlling agents. In an appendix, I prove several relevant results about the logic described, including soundness and completeness both for it and for certain natural extensions.

在这篇论文中，我提出并激发了使真实和控制的相互定义概念的逻辑，理解为要索引到代理的内涵命题运算符。虽然与传统中早期的逻辑有相似之处，但动机、语义和对象语言理论在关键点上有所不同。将此逻辑应用于广泛的代理形式理论，我将其用作一个框架来反对普遍存在的假设，即给定代理可用的最强行动或选项必须始终成对不相容。结论是这个假设与高阶控制的失败相冲突代理人对其控制程度或精确度的影响，像我们这样不完美的代理人所表现出的失败。我在这种情况下讨论模型，以了解这种不完美的自我控制代理。在附录中，我证明了关于所描述逻辑的几个相关结果，包括它和某些自然扩展的可靠性和完整性。