One of the standard examples in contemporary moral psychology originates in the works of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. He treats people's responses to the story of Julie and Mark, two siblings who decide to have casual, consensual, protected sex, as facts of human morality, providing evidence for his social intuitionist approach to moral judgements. We argue that Haidt's description of the facts of the story and the reactions of the respondents as ‘morally dumbfounded’ presupposes a view about moral reasoning that is more substantial than he acknowledges. Drawing on the philosophical work by Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, we explore how different descriptions of human morality, sexuality, and family relations engage us in evaluations about distinctive features of human life and language that go deeper than Haidt envisages. Thus, we show the need to attend to the concepts used to describe the facts of human moral psychology and the pictures of morality these concepts reveal about the researcher's own understanding of moral experience. This points to the particular responsibility any researcher into human moral psychology has for ensuring that the descriptions they offer are attuned to the complexities of the lives of those they form theories about and that these do not appear conceptually confounding.

中文翻译：

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被事实吓傻了？了解性关系的道德心理学

当代道德心理学的一个标准例子起源于社会心理学家乔纳森海特的作品。他将人们对朱莉和马克这两个决定随意、自愿、受保护的性行为的兄弟姐妹的故事的反应视为人类道德的事实，为他的社会直觉主义道德判断方法提供了证据。我们认为，Haidt 将故事的事实和受访者的反应描述为“道德上目瞪口呆”，这预设了一种比他承认的更重要的道德推理观点。借鉴 Iris Murdoch 和 Cora Diamond 的哲学著作，我们探讨了对人类道德、性行为和家庭关系的不同描述如何使我们参与到比 Haidt 设想的更深入的人类生活和语言的独特特征的评估中。因此，我们表明需要关注用于描述人类道德心理事实的概念以及这些概念揭示的关于研究者自身对道德经验的理解的道德图景。这表明任何研究人类道德心理学的研究人员都有责任确保他们提供的描述与他们形成理论的那些人的生活的复杂性相协调，并且这些描述不会在概念上出现混淆。