This qualitative case study explores the reasons behind disconnects between United States Army (Army) aviation safety and cybersecurity groups’ processes. The disconnects were defined as dissimilarities between Army aviation systems and inadvertent overlap of system implementation requirements. The disconnects cause an absence of explicit means to verify systems’ reresiliency to cybersecurity attacks that increase the risk to flight safety and mission readiness. Literature review revealed the absence of explicit guidance and the increase of cybersecurity issues affecting interconnected aviation systems. This study sought to discover the reasons behind the disconnects and explore how the disconnects could be improved to increase resiliency to cybersecurity attacks and decrease the risk to flight safety and mission readiness. The researcher used the organizational discontinuity theory (ODT) as the framework for determining the reason behind the lack of explicit guidance. Additionally, the researcher conducted interviews with knowledgeable safety and cybersecurity professionals and conducted data source triangulation using the safety and cybersecurity groups’ respective process documentation to justify key research findings and accomplish data analysis activities. Data analysis identified three themes: awareness, process critique, and logical and complementary improvement. This study concluded that one primary reason behind the disconnects between safety and cybersecurity groups’ processes is that both processes are isolated in terms of execution across the systems’ lifecycles. The isolation causes conflicting process requirements and inadvertent overlap where requirements could be improved if cross-functional group coordination occurred. This study also confirmed the necessity for leadership guidance to implement cross-functional group coordination and comprehensive processes to address the disconnects.

本定性案例研究探讨了美国陆军 (Army) 航空安全与网络安全小组流程之间脱节背后的原因。断开连接被定义为陆军航空系统之间的差异和系统实施要求的无意重叠。断开连接导致缺乏明确的方法来验证系统对网络安全攻击的弹性，从而增加飞行安全和任务准备的风险。文献审查显示，缺乏明确的指导，影响互连航空系统的网络安全问题越来越多。这项研究旨在发现脱节背后的原因，并探索如何改善脱节以提高对网络安全攻击的弹性并降低飞行安全和任务准备的风险。研究人员使用组织不连续性理论 (ODT) 作为确定缺乏明确指导背后原因的框架。此外，研究人员还采访了知识渊博的安全和网络安全专业人士，并使用安全和网络安全小组各自的过程文档进行了数据源三角测量，以证明关键研究结果的合理性并完成数据分析活动。数据分析确定了三个主题：意识、过程批判以及逻辑和互补改进。这项研究得出的结论是，安全和网络安全小组流程之间脱节的一个主要原因是，这两个流程在整个系统生命周期的执行方面都是孤立的。这种隔离会导致流程需求冲突和无意的重叠，如果发生跨职能组协调，需求可能会得到改进。这项研究还证实了领导指导实施跨职能团队协调和综合流程以解决脱节问题的必要性。