In this paper we analyse why an understanding of the global ‘non-system’, in which we now live, took so long to arrive after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. We first describe how knowledge of how an inflation-targeting regime would operate—what we call ‘Taylor-rule macroeconomics’—was only gradually created during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We then describe how, subsequent to this, an awareness emerged, also gradually, of how the international non-system might work, depending, as it does, on Taylor-rule macroeconomics being already in place. We then discuss the Great Moderation, making clear that a well-functioning global non-system would require not just inflation targeting and floating exchange rates in each country, but also adequate fiscal discipline, and a satisfactory form of financial regulation. We describe how a well-functioning version of this global non-system would actually fit together. We then discuss how this non-system has responded to two enormous challenges of the last 15 years, namely the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid pandemic. This discussion of what has happened in the recent past provides the background to a discussion, in the companion paper by Subacchi and Vines in this issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, of the challenges that the global non-system will face in the future.

中文翻译：

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从布雷顿森林体系到全球非体系：慢学的磨难

在本文中，我们分析了为什么在 1971 年布雷顿森林体系崩溃后，对我们现在生活的全球“非体系”的理解花了这么长时间。我们首先描述了通货膨胀目标制度的知识如何运作——我们称之为“泰勒规则宏观经济学”——只是在 1970 年代、80 年代和 90 年代才逐渐建立起来的。然后，我们描述了在此之后如何逐渐意识到国际非体系如何运作，这取决于已经存在的泰勒规则宏观经济学。然后我们讨论大缓和，明确一个运作良好的全球非体系不仅需要每个国家的通胀目标和浮动汇率，还需要适当的财政纪律和令人满意的金融监管形式。我们描述了这个全球非系统的一个运行良好的版本实际上是如何组合在一起的。然后，我们讨论这个非系统如何应对过去 15 年的两个巨大挑战，即全球金融危机和 Covid 大流行。对最近发生的事情的讨论为本期牛津经济政策评论中 Subacchi 和 Vines 的配套文件中关于全球非系统性未来将面临的挑战的讨论提供了背景.