This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.

中文翻译：

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创建新的主权债务重建机制：为什么激励、风险分担和 CAC 都很重要

本文认为，Covid 经济衰退以及伴随后 Covid 复苏而来的美国激进的货币紧缩政策，可能会导致新兴市场经济体的主权债务过剩——即不太可能完全偿还的债务。主权债务重建机制 (SDRM) 似乎有必要避免广泛无序的债务减记。我们基于 Anne Krueger 在 2002 年提出的 SDRM 提议（Krueger，2002a，b）讨论了一系列可用的程序。当时 Krugman（1988）已经提出任何 SDRM 都应该激励债务人，以便他们努力清偿债务（Krugman 合同）。Menzies (2004) 比这更进一步表明这些影响应该进一步加强，创造他所谓的“超激励效应”（孟席斯契约）。国际货币基金组织认为，债务人和债权人之间的风险分担也很重要（IMF，2020）。但我们表明，风险分担通常会产生与激励效应相反的方向，我们怀疑国际货币基金组织在多大程度上认识到这种权衡。最后，我们认为集体行动条款 (CAC) 增加了达成任何协议的可能性，无论协议是什么。它们将有助于避免出现无序债务减记的替代方案，这种结果既不会产生激励效应，也不会产生风险分担。我们认为集体行动条款 (CAC) 增加了达成任何协议的可能性，无论它是什么。它们将有助于避免出现无序债务减记的替代方案，这种结果既不会产生激励效应，也不会产生风险分担。我们认为集体行动条款 (CAC) 增加了达成任何协议的可能性，无论它是什么。它们将有助于避免出现无序债务减记的替代方案，这种结果既不会产生激励效应，也不会产生风险分担。