Former legislators who lobby exacerbate the effects of financial resources on the relative political influence that various organized interests achieve. These lobbyists receive more income and achieve favorable policy outcomes more often than other lobbyists. The value of these revolving-door lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued presence of former colleagues in legislatures. Former legislators achieve influence because of their insider connections, and membership turnover among incumbents decreases the value of this asset for interest groups. I examine the incomes and clienteles of former legislators who lobbied in the American states over seven decades. Turnover is a consistent, negative predictor of revolver value. This effect is enhanced by the presence of legislative staff support. This study is the first to examine the value of revolving-door lobbyists in the state legislatures. My findings imply that reforms that induce turnover help to level playing fields of political advocacy among interests with different levels of financial resources.

中文翻译：

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联系的偶然价值：立法更替和旋转门游说者

游说的前立法者加剧了财政资源对各种有组织的利益实现的相对政治影响的影响。与其他游说者相比，这些游说者获得更多收入并更频繁地取得有利的政策结果。然而，这些旋转门游说者的价值取决于立法机构前同事的持续存在。前立法者因其内部关系而获得影响力，而在职者的成员更替会降低该资产对利益集团的价值。我研究了七年来在美国各州游说的前立法者的收入和客户群。营业额是左轮手枪价值的一致的负面预测指标。立法人员的支持加强了这种效果。这项研究是第一个检查旋转门游说者在州立法机构中的价值的研究。我的研究结果表明，引发人员流动的改革有助于在具有不同财政资源水平的利益集团之间创造公平的政治宣传环境。