I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view.

中文翻译：

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行为和启发式模型也是模拟模型——这没关系

我研究了一些个人决策的行为和启发式模型，并认为这些模型假设的各种心理机制要求太高，无法由实际决策者有意或无意地实施。因此，与他们的拥护者通常声称的相反，行为和启发式模型最好理解为“假设”模型。然后我勾勒出一种科学的反现实主义版本，它证明了决策理论中模拟模型的实践是合理的，但超越了传统的工具主义。最后，我将我对决策模型的描述与最近关于心理主义与行为主义的争论联系起来，拒绝这两种立场，并提供另一种观点。