We investigate the pro-environmental behavior of green firms in a context where consumers value the goods’ eco-quality features. We present a two-sector monopolistic competition model with green and brown goods displaying both horizontal and vertical differentiation. Using analytical and quantitative techniques, we derive the optimal eco-quality level selected by green firms and the industry structure both in the short- and long-run equilibrium. We then study the effectiveness of three policy tools (green incentives, the imposition of a minimum quality standard, and green awareness campaigns) with respect to the policymaker’s objective of increasing the overall level of greenness, which we measure through a specific indicator. We find that each policy alone is apt to stimulate an increase in the greenness intensity compared to the unregulated equilibrium. Yet, their side effects in terms of market structure and the possibility that the intensity of application of a single tool may hit budgetary, political, or social limits call for a combination of two or more policies to overcome the above limits and get a higher overall level of greenness than that resulting from just one of them.

我们调查了在消费者重视商品生态质量特征的背景下绿色企业的环保行为。我们提出了一个两部门垄断竞争模型，其中绿色和棕色商品显示出横向和纵向差异化。使用分析和定量技术，我们推导出绿色企业选择的最佳生态质量水平和短期和长期均衡的产业结构。然后，我们研究了三种政策工具（绿色激励、最低质量标准的实施和绿色意识运动）在政策制定者提高整体绿色水平的目标方面的有效性，我们通过特定指标来衡量这一目标。我们发现，与不受监管的均衡相比，每项政策都容易刺激绿色强度的增加。然而，它们在市场结构方面的副作用以及单一工具的应用强度可能达到预算、政治或社会限制的可能性需要结合两种或多种政策来克服上述限制并获得更高的整体比其中一个产生的绿色水平。