The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on intricacies of provability logic and its arithmetical interpretations. To check whether Égré’s solutions are satisfactory, we use the criteria for solutions to paradoxes defined by Susan Haack and we propose some refinements of them. This article aims to describe to what extent the knower paradox can be solved using provability logic and to what extent the solutions proposed in the literature satisfy Haack’s criteria. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the relation between knowledge, proof, and provability, as inspired by the knower paradox and its solutions.

知道者悖论指出“我们知道这个陈述是错误的”这一陈述会导致不一致。本文以全新的视角审视了这一悖论，并从文献中提出了一些众所周知的解决方案。Paul Égré 通过调查和比较模态的三种不同可证明性解释，讨论了模态可证明性逻辑为悖论提供的三种可能解决方案，最初由 Skyrms、Anderson 和 Solovay 描述。在本文中，解释了一些背景以阐明 Égré 的解决方案，所有这三个解决方案都取决于可证明性逻辑及其算术解释的复杂性。为了检查 Égré 的解决方案是否令人满意，我们使用了 Susan Haack 定义的悖论解决方案标准，并提出了一些改进建议。本文旨在描述知识者悖论在多大程度上可以使用可证明性逻辑来解决，以及文献中提出的解决方案在多大程度上满足 Haack 的标准。最后，文章在知识者悖论及其解决方案的启发下，对知识、证明和可证明性之间的关系进行了一些思考。