It is not fair to ask of others what you are not willing to do yourself.(Eleanor Roosevelt).

Something seems troubling about Miguel's behavior. Yet it is hard to say what he is doing wrong. He did not ask anyone to act for his benefit. He never agreed to any park-walking plan. Given the number of people involved in the watch (imagine it is a town with thousands of volunteers at the ready), he is not meaningfully adding to anyone's burden.

Put more precisely:

Much about this claim is controversial: does the mere receipt of benefits really trigger obligations? Does this hold if beneficiaries do not acquiesce? Must the relevant benefits track objective or subjective good? But my interest lies in a further puzzle, one that arises once we accept that something in this vein explains the wrongness of Miguel's actions.

Many scholars treat Park and Snow as different in kind. While the former is said to involve wrongful free-riding, the latter is viewed as a predatory demand. Consequently, while Miguel is said to have a duty to join in, Neda is thought to do nothing wrong if she refuses to pay the bill.

The problem is that the two scenarios look remarkably similar. In both situations, a group of people provide an unrequested benefit and take their doing so to trigger an obligation for beneficiaries to repay in a manner specified by their benefactors. My goal in this essay is to make sense of these competing intuitions by developing an account of what differentiates predatory demands from practices that properly generate duties of fair play. In fact, I will argue, cases like Snow and Park are even more similar than theories of fair play have acknowledged. Nonetheless, we can distinguish the two by properly situating fair play in the broader moral landscape. Doing so better grounds the duty and, more precisely, illuminates its scope—but it requires profoundly reimagining what fair play asks of us in a way that calls into question long-standing assumptions about civic ethics.

My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I detail an account of the moral motivation that underlies the duty of fair play. Building on recent work by Garrett Cullity and others, I argue that such obligations arise from a concern for fairness best understood as a demand for appropriate impartiality. Those who free-ride make unjustified exceptions by granting themselves a privilege that they would deny to others. In Section II, I raise a challenge to recent attempts by Isabella Trifan to flesh out the relevant notion of impartiality. We can, she suggests, distinguish cases of free-riding and predatory demands by looking to participants' attitudes. On her account, people are similarly situated such that non-contributions constitute violations of impartiality so long as they share a preference for receiving the same good without contributing to its production. But this approach, I show, fails to capture widespread and appealing beliefs about fairness.

In Section III, I propose an alternative. Fairness concerns arise whenever people are willing to accept others working to their good, but unwilling to return the favor. This approach, I show, makes better sense of our intuitions. However, as I reveal in Section IV, it suggests significant revisions to our understanding of fair play. Accepting it requires upending long-standing claims about our responsibility to vote, pay taxes, and undertake other civic acts. In Section V, I defend this view against objections. The reciprocity approach, I argue, provides a more parsimonious, grounded, and instructive account of fair play, one that better explains and distinguishes cases of wrongdoing and predatory demands.

自己不愿意做的事去要求别人是不公平的。（埃莉诺·罗斯福）。

米格尔的行为似乎有些令人不安。但很难说他做错了什么。他没有要求任何人为他的利益行事。他从未同意任何公园散步计划。考虑到参与守望的人数（想象一下这是一个有数千名志愿者随时准备的小镇），他并没有增加任何人的负担。

更准确地说：

关于这一说法有很多争议：仅仅获得福利真的会引发义务吗？如果受益人不默许，这是否成立？相关利益必须遵循客观或主观利益吗？但我的兴趣在于另一个谜题，一旦我们接受这样的东西可以解释米格尔行为的错误，这个谜题就会出现。

许多学者将帕克和斯诺视为不同种类的。据说前者涉及不当搭便车，而后者则被视为掠夺性需求。因此，虽然据说米格尔有义务加入，但内达如果拒绝支付账单，则被认为没有做错什么。

问题是这两种情况看起来非常相似。在这两种情况下，一群人提供了未经请求的福利，并以此触发受益人按照其捐助者指定的方式偿还的义务。我在本文中的目标是通过解释掠夺性需求与正确产生公平竞争义务的实践的区别来理解这些相互竞争的直觉。事实上，我会争辩说，像斯诺和帕克这样的案例甚至比公平竞争理论所承认的还要相似。尽管如此，我们可以通过在更广泛的道德领域正确定位公平竞争来区分两者。这样做可以更好地奠定这一义务的基础，更准确地说，阐明其范围，但它需要深刻地重新构想公平竞争对我们的要求，从而对长期以来有关公民道德的假设提出质疑。

我的论证如下。在第一节中，我详细介绍了公平竞争义务背后的道德动机。基于加勒特·卡利蒂（Garrett Cullity）和其他人最近的工作，我认为这种义务源于对公平的关注，最好将其理解为对适当公正性的要求。那些搭便车的人会给予自己一种他们会拒绝给予他人的特权，从而做出不合理的例外。在第二节中，我对伊莎贝拉·特里凡最近试图充实相关公正性概念的尝试提出了挑战。她建议，我们可以通过观察参与者的态度来区分搭便车和掠夺性需求的情况。在她的账户上，人们的情况也类似，只要他们都倾向于接受同样的商品而不为其生产做出贡献，那么不捐款就构成了对公正性的侵犯。但我表明，这种方法未能捕捉到关于公平的广泛且有吸引力的信念。

在第三节中，我提出了一个替代方案。当人们愿意接受他人为自己谋福利，但又不愿意回报时，就会出现公平问题。我证明，这种方法可以更好地理解我们的直觉。然而，正如我在第四节中所揭示的，它建议我们对公平竞争的理解进行重大修改。接受它需要推翻长期以来关于我们有责任投票、纳税和开展其他公民行为的主张。在第五节中，我针对反对意见捍卫了这一观点。我认为，互惠方法为公平竞争提供了一种更为简约、更有根据、更有启发性的解释，可以更好地解释和区分不当行为和掠夺性要求的情况。