This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses about intention, intentional action, and practical reason. And they give rise to a puzzle about rather-than constructions such as ‘I intend to ϕ rather than ψ’: In side effect cases it can seem wrong to claim that the subject intends to ϕ yet acceptable to claim that they intend to ϕ rather than ψ. This cries out for explanation. Contrastivism provides a unified response to all of these problems.

本文介绍并论证了关于意图的对比主义。根据对比主义，意图不是主体和行动之间的二元关系。相反，它是主体、动作和替代项之间的三元关系。对比主义是通过对已知但（显然）非预期副作用的案例的讨论而引入的。此类案例令人费解。他们向我们施加压力，要求我们拒绝一些关于意图、有意行动和实践理性的非常引人注目的论点。它们引起了关于“而不是”结构的困惑，例如“我打算phi而不是ψ ”：在副作用情况下，声称主体打算phi似乎是错误的，但声称他们打算phi而不是可以接受的比ψ。这急需解释。对比主义为所有这些问题提供了统一的答案。