We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.

中文翻译：

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公共物品供应谈判不透明

我们考虑就公共物品的提供进行最后通牒讨价还价。报价者和响应者可以将他们的决策委托给实际决策规则不透明的代理。我们表明，即使有双边授权，响应者也将从战略不透明中受益。战略不透明选择所产生的不完整信息不会导致均衡谈判中低效的失败。效率低下源于低效的供给水平。虽然协议总会达成，但公共物品的供给将达不到社会理想的水平。与单边授权相比，双边授权从福利角度来看绝不差。