The recent debate regarding the eligibility of converts to Judaism (gerim) to sit on a beṯ din – a judicial panel – is unexpected. In the 19th century, when rabbis first begin to answer questions about whether or not gerim may serve on panels for the conversion of other potential gerim, the tone is consistently one of surprise: the answer was an obvious yes. In later reflections, however, the tone shifts, with increasing demands for definitive proof that no prohibition exists. But such a proof has been hard to articulate based on the classical sources. This article contends that the eligibility of a ger to sit a beṯ din was at one point obvious because such acceptance mirrors a central characteristic of classical Jewish judicial culture, which rests on welcoming strangeness and, hence, human strangers. Truth, this is, was understood to arrive through a gap rent in the familiarity that ordinarily rests between members of a community.

中文翻译：

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谁戴链子？

最近关于皈依犹太教的资格的辩论（萌芽) 坐在beṯdin- 一个司法小组 - 是出乎意料的。在 19 世纪，当拉比们第一次开始回答关于是否萌芽可用于转换其他潜力的小组萌芽，语气始终是一种惊讶：答案显然是肯定的。然而，在后来的反思中，基调发生了变化，越来越多的人要求提供明确的证据来证明不存在禁令。但是这样的证明很难基于经典来源来阐明。这篇文章认为，一个资格蒙古包坐一个beṯdin有一点是显而易见的，因为这种接受反映了古典犹太司法文化的一个核心特征，这种文化依赖于欢迎陌生人，因此也欢迎陌生人。也就是说，真相被理解为通过通常存在于社区成员之间的熟悉程度的差距来实现。