Wilfrid Sellars is usually read as claiming that only the unobservable, theoretical objects which science would postulate at the ideal end of inquiry are real. Against this, Willem deVries has suggested that we can develop a notion of practical reality in the context of Sellars's philosophy which would pertain primarily to commonsense objects. I use deVries's suggestion as a foil to clarify Sellars's own commitments about the practical. I show that the notion of practical reality is not necessary to secure the ultimate legitimacy of practical concepts. We can retreat to the less committed notion of practical truth. I argue that the notion of practical truth may not be sufficient to ensure that ultimately legitimate practical concepts are commonsense concepts in Sellars's framework. Nevertheless, deVries's suggestion highlights that Sellars's vision of an ultimate conceptual system may have been richer than is often thought.

中文翻译：

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塞拉斯、现实的现实和现实的真相

威尔弗里德·塞拉斯通常被解读为声称，只有科学在理想的探究终点所假设的不可观察的理论对象才是真实的。与此相反，威廉·德弗里斯建议我们可以在塞拉斯哲学的背景下发展一种实际现实的概念，该概念主要涉及常识对象。我用德弗里斯的建议作为衬托来澄清塞拉斯自己对实践的承诺。我表明，实践现实的概念对于确保实践概念的最终合法性来说并不是必要的。我们可以退回到不太坚定的实践真理概念。我认为，实践真理的概念可能不足以确保最终合法的实践概念是塞拉斯框架中的常识概念。尽管如此，德弗里斯的建议强调了塞拉斯对终极概念系统的愿景可能比通常想象的更丰富。