ABSTRACT

This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders’ identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.

摘要

本研究分析了与家族共存的其他大股东的存在、数量、所有权和身份如何影响上市公司不成比例的家族董事会权力。使用西班牙市场 8 年期间的数据库，结果表明，其他大股东的数量及其对家族的相对所有权增加了董事会中不成比例的家族董事会权力。此外，当其他大股东拥有比家族更多的所有权时，不成比例的家族董事会代表就会增加。调查结果还强调了其他大股东身份的重要性。外国投资者减少了不成比例的家族董事会权力，而它似乎不受家族和个人或机构投资者的影响。总共，