ABSTRACT

Whether economics warrants public trust depends on the extent to which assertions by economists can be deemed credible. Three examples from microeconomics are examined to assess how the discipline performs in this regard. First, a purely theoretical argument with broad conceptual implications: a quasi-evolutionary argument for rational choice based on the notion of money pumps. Second, a modelling-related claim with significant social implications: economists’ objection to minimum wages based on a simple supply-demand model. Third, methodological choices with implications for all empirical work in microeconomics: the recent proclamation of a ‘credibility revolution’ in applied microeconomics through the use of experimental and quasi-experimental methods. These are assessed against proposed criteria for credibility: epistemic validity, epistemic reliability, and epistemic reflexivity. On the basis of the performance of the discipline against these criteria on the examples considered, I conclude that public distrust of economics and economists can be well-founded.

摘要

经济学是否值得公众信任，取决于经济学家的主张在多大程度上可以被视为可信。研究了微观经济学的三个例子，以评估该学科在这方面的表现。首先，具有广泛概念含义的纯理论论证：基于货币泵概念的理性选择的准进化论证。其次，具有重大社会影响的与模型相关的主张：经济学家反对基于简单供需模型的最低工资。第三，对微观经济学所有实证工作具有影响的方法论选择：最近通过使用实验和准实验方法宣布了应用微观经济学的“可信度革命”。这些是根据拟议的可信度标准进行评估的：认知有效性，认知可靠性和认知反身性。根据所考虑的例子中该学科对这些标准的表现，我得出的结论是，公众对经济学和经济学家的不信任是有充分根据的。