What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses.

中文翻译：

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全球化世界中的议价能力：全球价值链在贸易谈判中的影响

什么决定了各国在国际贸易谈判中的议价能力？文献主要关注经济实力作为议价能力的决定因素。然而，这种解释忽视了现代贸易的现实，其特点是生产全球化和经济高度相互依存。我认为，这种相互依存削弱了经济实力对国家议价能力的影响。具体来说，我假设当一个国家的公司依赖谈判伙伴的投入进行生产时，经济实力的影响会下降，因为它们已融入全球价值链。一个国家的公司越依赖伙伴国家，该国越不能通过发挥其经济实力迫使伙伴国做出让步。为了检验这一假设，我使用了一个数据集，该数据集涵盖了 54 个国家在 61 个优惠贸易协定中对服务业自由化做出的让步。通过计算每个合作伙伴的相对让步，我构建了贸易谈判结果的量化指标。该指标应反映每个谈判方潜在的议价能力。对这些谈判结果进行回归分析的结果大多支持我的假设。我构建了贸易谈判结果的量化指标。该指标应反映每个谈判方潜在的议价能力。对这些谈判结果进行回归分析的结果大多支持我的假设。我构建了贸易谈判结果的量化指标。该指标应反映每个谈判方潜在的议价能力。对这些谈判结果进行回归分析的结果大多支持我的假设。