The relationship between power, governance and value creation/capture is a central concern in global value chain (GVC) research. In the context of calls to develop a more expansive view of power in GVCs, we argue for retaining a focus on bargaining power, but shifting the conceptualization of bargaining power from the dyad to the network. We advance two arguments. First, we elaborate an exchange theoretic model in which skew of value capture is a function of the degree of power asymmetry inherent in the ratio of buyers to suppliers. Second, we explain how this model can be expanded to consider the role of external factors, such as the institutional and normative contexts in which exchange occurs. Rather than see these factors as contending forms of power, we treat them as forces that can affect value skew by either attenuating the bargaining power of lead firms or by moderating the distributional effects of power asymmetries between exchange partners. We conclude that an exchange theoretic approach to bargaining power in GVCs provides a parsimonious framework for explaining how inter-firm governance shapes the distribution of value capture in global production.

中文翻译：

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全球价值链中的权力、治理和分配偏差：交换理论和外生因素

权力、治理和价值创造/获取之间的关系是全球价值链（GVC）研究的核心问题。在呼吁对全球价值链中的权力形成更广泛的看法的背景下，我们主张保留对讨价还价能力的关注，但将讨价还价能力的概念从二元转移到网络。我们提出两个论点。首先，我们阐述了一个交换理论模型，其中价值捕获的偏差是买方与供应商比率固有的权力不对称程度的函数。其次，我们解释如何扩展该模型以考虑外部因素的作用，例如交换发生的制度和规范环境。与其将这些因素视为权力的竞争形式，我们将它们视为可以通过削弱主导公司的议价能力或通过缓和交换伙伴之间权力不对称的分配效应来影响价值偏差的力量。我们的结论是，全球价值链中讨价还价能力的交换理论方法提供了一个简约的框架，用于解释企业间治理如何塑造全球生产中价值获取的分配。