ABSTRACT

Progress made in European defence-industrial integration has been subjected to the hardest test with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has had profound implications for European defence industries across the board and spurred on massive investment into the sector. Based on extensive analysis of procurements, adopted policies, and shifts in discourse, we argue that the practical steps undertaken by Central and Eastern European (CEE) defence industries in the wake of the conflict are disintegrational. This is contrary to many discernible indicators which align with European integrational initiatives in defence. Moreover, the paper argues that the pattern of decisions taken by Central and Eastern European countries reinforces structural barriers to potential future European defence-industrial integration. The findings are significant to EU-wide, regional, and bilateral defence-industrial co-operation as well as national defence industrial strategies in reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

摘要

欧洲国防工业一体化取得的进展因 2022 年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰而受到最严峻的考验。这场冲突对欧洲国防工业产生了全面深远的影响，并刺激了对该行业的大规模投资。基于对采购、采取的政策和话语转变的广泛分析，我们认为中东欧（CEE）国防工业在冲突后采取的实际步骤是瓦解的。这与许多与欧洲国防一体化倡议相一致的明显指标相反。此外，本文还认为，中欧和东欧国家的决策模式强化了未来欧洲国防工业一体化的结构性障碍。