I demonstrate that transacting parties may expend resources on ex ante contracting, which may not be legally enforceable, to help build and maintain their long-term relationships. I first introduce three legal concepts, namely scaffolding, managerial provisions, and formal relational contracts, which highlight the recent trend towards more detailed contracts. These concepts indicate that the role of detailed contracts is not to improve judicial contract enforcement, but to enhance clarity and alignment of interests and to reduce renegotiation costs, which ultimately support the parties’ relationships. I then proceed to present and analyze a simple reduced-form model, which demonstrates that the parties’ efforts for ex ante contracting are not necessarily monotonic with the level of alignment of their interests. Furthermore, I discuss recent contracting practices in Japan and attempt to provide an explanation for the lack of change observed in these practices.

我证明交易方可能会在事前合同上花费资源，这可能无法在法律上强制执行，以帮助建立和维持他们的长期关系。我首先介绍三个法律概念，即脚手架、管理条款和正式关系合同，这突出了最近合同更详细的趋势。这些概念表明，详细合同的作用不是改善司法合同的执行，而是提高利益的清晰度和一致性，并降低重新谈判成本，最终支持双方的关系。然后，我继续介绍和分析一个简单的简化模型，该模型表明各方为事前缔约所做的努力不一定与他们的利益一致程度是单调的。此外，我讨论了日本最近的承包实践，并试图对这些实践中观察到的缺乏变化做出解释。